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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated
association of reporters and editors with no parent corporation and no stock.
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the American Civil
Liberties Union of Florida are non-profit entities that do not have parent
corporations. No publicly held corporation owns 10 percent or more of any stake
or stock in amici curiae ACLU or ACLU of Florida.
The Authors Guild Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held
corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.
The Center for Democracy & Technology has no parent corporation and,
because it is a non-stock corporation, no publicly held corporation owns 10% or
more of its stock.
The Media Law Resource Center has no parent corporation and issues no
stock.
PEN American Center, Inc. has no parent or affiliate corporation.
No party’s counsel has authored this brief, in whole or in part. Furthermore,
no party or party’s counsel, other than proposed amici, their members, or their
counsel, has funded the research, writing, preparation, or submission of this brief.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (the “Reporters
Committee”) is an unincorporated non-profit association. The Reporters
Committee was founded by leading journalists and media lawyers in 1970 when
the nation’s news media faced an unprecedented wave of government subpoenas
forcing reporters to name confidential sources. Today, its attorneys provide pro
bono legal representation, amicus curiae support, and other legal resources to
protect First Amendment freedoms and the newsgathering rights of journalists.
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) is a nationwide, nonpartisan, non-profit organization. The ACLU of Florida is a state affiliate of the
ACLU. Both organizations are dedicated to defending the principles embodied in
the Constitution and our nation’s civil rights laws and, for decades, have been at
the forefront of efforts nationwide to protect the full array of civil rights and
liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press online. The ACLU
and the ACLU of Florida have frequently appeared before courts throughout the
country in First Amendment cases, both as direct counsel and as amici curiae.
The Authors Guild, Inc. was founded in 1912, and is a national non-profit
association of more than 9,000 professional, published writers of all genres. The
Guild counts historians, biographers, academicians, journalists and other writers of
nonfiction and fiction as members. The Guild works to promote the rights and
1
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professional interests of authors in various areas, including defending their right of
freedom of expression. Many Guild members earn their livelihoods through their
writing. Their work covers important issues in history, biography, science, politics,
medicine, business and other areas; they are frequent contributors to the most
influential and well-respected publications in every field.
Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) is a non-profit public interest
organization. For more than 25 years, CDT has represented the public’s interest in
an open, decentralized internet and worked to ensure that the constitutional and
democratic values of free expression and privacy are protected in the digital age.
CDT regularly advocates in support of the First Amendment and protections for
online speech before legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts.
The Media Law Resource Center, Inc. (“MLRC”) is a non-profit
professional association for content providers in all media, and for their defense
lawyers, providing a wide range of resources on media and content law, as well as
policy issues. These include news and analysis of legal, legislative, and regulatory
developments; litigation resources and practice guides; and national and
international media law conferences and meetings. The MLRC also works with its
membership to respond to legislative and policy proposals and speaks to the press
and public on media law and First Amendment issues. It counts as members over
125 media companies, including newspaper, magazine and book publishers, TV
2
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and radio broadcasters, and digital platforms, and over 200 law firms working in
the media law field. The MLRC was founded in 1980 by leading American
publishers and broadcasters to assist in defending and protecting free press rights
under the First Amendment.
PEN American Center, Inc. (“PEN America” or “PEN”) is a nonprofit
organization that represents and advocates for the freedom to write and freedom of
expression, both in the United States and abroad. PEN America is affiliated with
more than 100 centers worldwide that comprise the PEN International network. Its
membership includes more than 7,500 journalists, novelists, poets, essayists, and
other professionals. PEN America stands at the intersection of journalism,
literature, and human rights to protect free expression. PEN champions the
freedom of people everywhere to write, create literature, convey information and
ideas, and express their views, recognizing the power of the word to transform the
world. PEN America supports the First Amendment and freedom of expression in
the United States.
Amici collectively represent the First Amendment interests of media outlets
and communication platforms across all technologies and the public’s interest in
receiving and disseminating information free from government censorship or
control. Amici submit this brief because they are concerned that S.B. 7072 violates

3
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fundamental First Amendment rights that animate and preserve robust public
debate across all media.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
S.B. 7072 compels private communications platforms to carry speech by
others that they would otherwise not host, and it allows the State to directly
regulate how private communications platforms curate, edit, or comment on that
speech. Any law that permits the state to police the content of lawful speech on a
private communications platform could permit government officials to force
platforms to carry speech perceived as favorable to the government or to pressure
platforms to remove speech perceived as unfavorable. S.B. 7072, therefore, vests
the State of Florida with the pure power of the censor, and it poses an acute threat
to essential First Amendment protections for the press and public.
Amici the Reporters Committee, MLRC, and PEN America take no position
on technology platforms’ content moderation policies or practices; other Amici,
including the ACLU and CDT, have expressed an array of views on the public
policy implications of how and when platforms moderate content by public
officials or others. All Amici are, however, united in their position that the curation
of lawful content online constitutes an exercise of “editorial control and
judgment,” which cannot be regulated by the state “consistent with First

4
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Amendment guarantees.” Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) (“Tornillo”).
Accordingly, Amici write to address the following two points in support of
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
First, government efforts to force online platforms to carry the speech of
particular speakers, including political candidates, contravene the rule articulated
by the Supreme Court in Tornillo. Under Tornillo, it is impermissible for the
government, regardless of motive, to mandate that a private editor “publish that
which reason tells [it] should not be published.” Id. at 256 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Similarly, the danger in a legally enforceable mandate that
platforms exercise their editorial discretion “consistently” is manifest; it would
permit the state to control what information flows to the public and when. See id. at
260 (White, J., concurring) (“[A]ny . . . system that would supplant private control
of the press with the heavy hand of government intrusion . . . would make the
government the censor of what the people may read and know.”).
Here, S.B. 7072 forces online platforms to carry the speech of political
candidates, and it additionally prohibits them from curating (i.e., prioritizing or
“shadowbanning”) that speech, or any speech about those candidates. In addition,
Florida officials have explicitly stated that S.B. 7072’s goal is to address perceived
bias on platforms. See, e.g., News Release, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to
5
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Stop the Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/
5A2C-79ZG (“If Big Tech censors enforce rules inconsistently, to discriminate in
favor of the dominant Silicon Valley ideology, they will now be held
accountable.”).
S.B. 7072 violates the First Amendment in that it undermines the necessary
protections for public discourse established in Tornillo for other forms of media,
including traditional news organizations. Cf. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144–45 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(noting concern that requiring broadcast licensees to carry paid editorial
advertising could erode editorial autonomy of print media). For precisely that
reason, courts have extended the Tornillo rule—a “virtually insurmountable barrier
[against] . . . government tampering . . . with news and editorial content,” 418 U.S.
at 259 (White, J., concurring)—to online communications platforms such as search
engines and social media, see, e.g., Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d
433, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In short, Plaintiffs’ efforts to hold [search engine]
Baidu accountable in a court of law for its editorial judgments about what political
ideas to promote cannot be squared with the First Amendment.”). By forcing
communications platforms to carry political speech they otherwise would not, or
prohibiting platforms from, for instance, adding commentary to third-party posts,
S.B. 7072 clearly violates the rule articulated in Tornillo.
6
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Second, S.B. 7072 prohibits platforms from moderating any content from
“journalistic enterprises,” including entities that publish a certain number of words
or host a certain number of hours of video online. At first blush, this provision
could be seen as a salutary protection for the covered entities; yet, if allowed to
stand, it would in practice gravely injure First Amendment rights. The journalistic
enterprise provision bars platforms from “edit[ing]” or “post[ing] an addendum to
any content or material.” 2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-32, § 4 (S.B. 7072).
In other words, the provision itself acts as a prior restraint on a technology
platform’s own speech. Protections for editing, adding a disclaimer, or similar
types of speech are central to press freedom, and permitting censorship by the state
in this manner would significantly erode the rule articulated in Tornillo that has
been applied to an array of media and expressive activity beyond print in later
cases.
For these reasons, Amici respectfully urge the Court to grant Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction.

7
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ARGUMENT
I.

The must-carry provision for political candidates violates First
Amendment protections for the free flow of information to the public.
Private curation of content online—especially content related to public

affairs and government officials—is an inextricable component of much modern
public discourse. 1 Such private curation necessarily entails making decisions
about what material is allowed or disallowed on a platform—including statements
of or about political candidates. In 1974, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
that the First Amendment forbids governmental interference in editorial decisions
by the print media when it held unconstitutional Florida’s “right of reply” statute,

Amici emphasize that the online content regulated under S.B. 7072 is core
political speech, “an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections
is at its zenith.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (invalidating Colorado
prohibition on paid petition circulators as violative of First Amendment) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The restrictions on moderating political candidates,
“journalistic enterprises,” and the requirement that moderation policies be applied
“consistently,” all trench on the ability of communications platforms to lawfully
curate speech on their platforms, in a manner directly analogous to the right-ofreply statute in Tornillo. This is not a regulation concerning “a classic example of
commercial speech,” see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), nor does it involve the application of a
generally applicable law like antitrust against a private speaker, see Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 254 (distinguishing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945),
and noting that Associated Press Court clarified that district court decree pursuant
to Sherman Act “does not compel AP or its members to permit publication of
anything which their ‘reason’ tells them should not be published” (quoting 326
U.S. at 20 n.18)). Rather, S.B. 7072 directly interferes with the ability of
communications platforms to present core political speech in the manner that their
“reason” dictates.
1
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which “grant[ed] a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism
and attacks on his record by a newspaper.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243, 258.
The Court in Tornillo made clear that government regulation of the “choice
of material” to include in a newspaper cannot be “exercised consistent with First
Amendment guarantees.” Id. at 258. This conclusion applies when such decisions
deal with the “treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or
unfair.” Id. Indeed, press autonomy in decisions “about what and what not to
publish” has been described as “absolute.” See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth
Estate and the Constitution 277 (1992) (“Because editorial autonomy is indivisible,
it must be absolute.”); see also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring)
(“According to our accepted jurisprudence, the First Amendment erects a virtually
insurmountable barrier between government and the print media so far as
government tampering, in advance of publication, with news and editorial content
is concerned.” (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971))).
Notably, the unanimous Tornillo decision came at the height of fallout from
Watergate and shortly after a request by President Richard Nixon that the Justice
Department explore the need for a federal right-of-reply statute because of press
coverage perceived as critical of public officials in the press. Anthony Lewis,
Nixon and a Right of Reply, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1974, at E2, https://perma.cc/
2W2J-AJ65 (“Overhanging the debate is the reality of Watergate, where a vigorous
9
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press broke through repeated official White House denials of wrongdoing.”).
Today, government actions like S.B. 7072 are being considered and enacted
against a similar backdrop of claims by politicians that they are being silenced by
social media companies, and a flood of legislative proposals similar to S.B. 7072
that are often expressly described as efforts to counter perceived “bias” in content
moderation practices. David McCabe, Florida, in a First, Will Fine Social Media
Companies That Bar Candidates, N.Y. Times (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/
6QM6-N78P (“More than a hundred bills targeting the companies’ moderation
practices have been filed nationwide this year, according to the National
Conference of State Legislatures.”). But the Supreme Court has made clear that
“any . . . compulsion to publish that which reason tells [the press] should not be
published is unconstitutional.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256 (citation and marks
omitted). Such laws “operate[ ] as a command in the same sense as a statute or
regulation forbidding [platforms] to publish specified matter.” Id.
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in Tornillo emphasized two
inevitable consequences of permitting the government to mandate access to print
media. Id. at 254. First, a “[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably
‘dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate,’” id. at 257 (quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279), which “of course includes
discussions of candidates,” id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
10
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(1966)). Second, must-carry provisions “intru[de] into the function of editors,”
including choices they would otherwise make about “the material to [publish]” and
“the treatment of public issues and public officials.” Id. at 258. In other words, an
enforceable right of access poses the threat of direct press censorship: “[L]iberty
of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go into
a newspaper.” Id. at 258 n.24 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Government and Mass
Communications 633 (1947)). This holds for S.B. 7072, which would rob online
platforms—and therefore their users—of any choice in whether, and how, to
publish—or interact with—content by political candidates.
While the Tornillo Court confronted these issues in the context of print
media, the Supreme Court has since recognized that the internet as a
communications medium is entitled to full First Amendment protection. Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.
Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (holding unconstitutional a governmental ban on access
to social media, and finding that “social media users employ these websites to
engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity”). The Court has
also recognized the application of Tornillo “well beyond the newspaper context,”
including new communications mediums. Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437.
Further, as the Court has since explained, “a private speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to
11
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edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
569–70 (1995).
Applying those principles, courts have held that online platform decisions
about what lawful content to host on their sites receive First Amendment
protection. See Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (holding that, in the context of
search engine results, the government “may not tell a private speaker what to
include or not to include in speech about matters of public concern” and
recognizing that “a search engine’s editorial judgment is much like many other
familiar editorial judgments, such as the newspaper editor’s judgment of which
wire-services stories to run and where to place them in the newspaper” (citation
and marks omitted)); e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-646,
2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“A search engine is akin to a
publisher, whose judgments about what to publish and what not to publish are
absolutely protected by the First Amendment.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *2–4 (W.D. Okla. May 27,
2003) (search rankings are protected opinion). Further, these protections apply
equally to decisions to remove or exclude content. See, e.g., La’Tiejira v.
Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding Facebook
could decide whether to take down or leave up a post because of “Facebook’s First
12
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Amendment right to decide what to publish and what not to publish on its
platform”); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007)
(holding First Amendment right extends to decisions to exclude content from
search platform). Crucially, these protections apply irrespective of the
government’s intention in seeking to intervene in these decisions. See Jian Zhang,
10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (“Put simply, ‘[d]isapproval of a private speaker’s
statement’—no matter how justified disapproval may be—‘does not legitimize use
of the [Government’s] power to compel the speaker to alter the message by
including one more acceptable to others.’” (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581)).
The animating concern in Tornillo—that the power to compel or silence
speech on a communications medium would allow the government to improperly
skew public discussion of its policies through mandates, chill, or direct
suppression—applies when the government seeks to dictate what appears online,
whether on social media platforms or search engines. Vesting the censorial power
in the government to interfere with online platforms’ exercise of editorial control
and judgment is antithetical to the public’s interest in freely receiving and
disseminating information. Government intrusion into such decisions “dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public debate.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (quoting
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).

13
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In short, if a major purpose of the First Amendment is to allow public
discourse to “serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power,” Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted), the First Amendment must
protect how private actors choose to relay speech by the public and by candidates
concerning government affairs. S.B. 7072 squarely interferes with the exercise of
that discretion, and, worse, it does so in an explicit effort to force platforms to
carry the speech of political candidates and police “bias” online, powers that the
Tornillo Court categorically denied the government. See id. at 256 (“A responsible
press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by
the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”).
II.

The “journalistic enterprise” carve-out is unconstitutional because it is
contrary to Tornillo and impairs newsgathering rights.
S.B. 7072 creates a new Section 501.2041(j) in the Florida Statutes that

prohibits a “social media platform” from taking any action to “censor, deplatform,
or shadow ban a journalistic enterprise based on the content of its publication or
broadcast.” 2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-32, § 4 (S.B. 7072). A
“journalistic enterprise” is defined as an entity doing business in Florida that
publishes in excess of 100,000 words available online with at least 50,000 paid
subscribers or 100,000 monthly active users; publishes 100 hours of audio or video
available online with at least 100 million viewers annually; operates a cable
channel that provides more than 40 hours of content per week to more than
14
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100,000 cable subscribers; or holds a broadcast license from the Federal
Communications Commission. See id. (creating new § 501.2041(d)).
Taken together, S.B. 7072’s prohibition on “censoring, deplatforming, or
shadow banning” effectively precludes an affected communications platform from
moderating any content created by an entity that qualifies under the definition of
“journalistic enterprise,” including removal of the content for violating platform
policies or even the addition of commentary by the platform to a post.
This moderation ban also violates the central principle underpinning
Tornillo. A news organization must be free to exercise editorial discretion not just
in terms of what content it decides to publish, but also in terms of how it presents
that content (by appending disclaimers to advertising, as just one example).
Likewise, Tornillo makes clear that when a communications platform speaks in its
own voice by curating or commenting on content on its platform, First Amendment
protections apply. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
Further, the provision is not saved by its preclusion of “content-based”
moderation by the platforms (that is, platforms may not moderate based on “the
content of [the enterprise’s] publication or broadcast”). By purporting to prohibit
content-based “censorship” by the platform, S.B. 7072 vests the state with the
power to determine when a platform has engaged in such “censorship,” which
necessarily turns the state into the censoring party. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254
15
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(“However much validity may be found in the[ ] argument [that fairness and
accuracy can only be achieved through accountability imposed through
government action],” if the mechanism used “is governmental coercion, this at
once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First
Amendment”). This is because “[a] journal does not merely print observed facts
the way a cow is photographed through a plateglass window.” Id. at 258 n.24
(quoting Zechariah Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 633 (1947)).
Rather, “you have interpretation and you have selection, and editorial selection
opens the way to editorial suppression.” Id. In other words, “how can the state
force abstention from discrimination in the news without dictating selection?” Id.
Public officials will be tempted to use that authority to punish moderation
decisions that they perceive as unfavorable, while ignoring decisions perceived as
favorable. That is one of the central dangers identified by the Tornillo Court—the
government’s ability to skew public discourse in the name of combatting “bias.”
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256. As such, this provision, if allowed to stand, poses
the same risk articulated above; it would weaken Tornillo’s protections for
everyone, across all media. That violates the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, Amici respectfully urge the Court to grant Plaintiffs’
motion for a preliminary injunction.
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